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Foreword for Michael Harris,
“A Right of Ethical Consideration for Non-Human
Animals”
Martha C. Nussbaum1
It is an honor and a pleasure to introduce Michael Harris’s important
article. I have long admired Harris’s work as the Director of the Wildlife
Division of Friends of Animals, where, as a creative and brilliant lawyer,
he has done remarkable work, both as an advocate for animals in legal
actions of many kinds, a few of which he mentions in this article, and also
as an inspiring leader of an increasingly numerous and powerful legal team.
Now, however, Harris articulates the bold theory that undergirds his legal
practice.
Harris is correct: our world is at a crossroads. A new ethical
consciousness is arising, gradually supplanting many centuries of
obtuseness. No longer is it simply taken for granted that non-human
animals are mere objects or property, to be used as humans please.
Increasingly people feel ethical concern, not only for domesticated animals,
but also for animals in the wild. And concern is not limited to pain and
suffering: it extends, increasingly to the “capabilities” of animals for free
movement, for relationships with creatures of their own kind, for pleasure
and perception and play, in short for a form of life that is their own. And
yet law lags behind: animals have not yet been given standing in any legal
proceeding, U.S. or international.
Competing accounts of the best philosophical basis for animal
entitlements are emerging. (I myself am writing a book to be called Justice
for Animals: A New Theory of Animal Welfare, and to be published in
2022 by Simon and Schuster, where I use my Capabilities Approach, to
which Harris kindly refers, as the basis for my own preferred account.)
Harris’s article proposes a bold first step that can be enthusiastically
welcomed by my own theory and by others: namely, a right of ethical
consideration, a right to have one’s good made the subject of a genuinely
ethical deliberation. Right now, deliberation about animals in law and
politics is almost never ethical in the sense of being concerned ethically
with the animals’ own good. So simply getting the good of animals into
the discussion, onto the table, is a step that would revolutionize all legal
deliberations.
1. Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics, Law
School and Philosophy Department, University of Chicago.
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Harris convincingly argues that a genuinely ethical deliberation
should have three ingredients: philosophy, science, and law. He shows why
an interdisciplinary cooperation among all three disciplines is urgently
needed, and he gives some illustrations of legal deliberations informed in
the way he proposes. Sometimes these legal proceedings became ethical
more or less by chance. In the example involving whales and the Navy’s
sonar program, the Marine Mammal Protection Act was a rare case of a
statute that asked judges to consider the welfare of individual animals, and
not simply species survival. The interpretation of the statute was ethical in
a further way, taking account of the whales’ capabilities, not simply of pain
and harm – probably because the judges concerned had an ethical
awareness of whale lives that informed their deliberations. In other cases,
Harris’s own creative lawyering supplied the ethical dimension. But our
world should not depend on isolated or chance results in order to become
more ethical. We need an ethical consensus, here and now, that non-human
animals are not mere property. They are intelligent, sentient beings with a
good of their own and a form of life of their own.
There will be many difficult questions ahead, and many conflicts. But
if humanity can take the first step of committing to a genuinely ethical form
of deliberation about the good of non-human animals, that is already a
radical step into a new era, the era of a genuinely multi-species society.

70

Hastings Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 27, No. 1, Winter 2021

A Right of Ethical Consideration for Non-Human
Animals
Michael Ray Harris2
We must fight against the spirit of unconscious cruelty with
which we treat the animals. Animals suffer as much as we do. True
humanity does not allow us to impose such sufferings on them. It
is our duty to make the whole world recognize it. Until we extend
our circle of compassion to all living things, we ourselves will not
find peace.
--Albert Schweitzer
Introduction
For millennia, humans have philosophized over the appropriate legal
status and rights due to other species with whom we share this planet.3
Given this lengthy discourse, it is not difficult to understand how many
current scholars might conclude that while the idea of legal rights for
animals remains “theoretically interesting,” it is “far removed” from
practical reality.4 There is, however, an unmistakable difference in the
conversation about animal rights today. It is no longer a discussion reserved
for the scholarly. The question over legal rights for some, if not all, animals,
has become a subject of intense public debate fueled by shared influences:5
the expanding number of animal activist organizations;6 increased

2. Director, Wildlife Law Program, Friends of Animals. Former Assistant Professor
of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law (2008-2014). J.D., University of
California at Berkeley (1995). M.S.L. Vermont Law School (1992). B.A. Pitzer College
(1991). This paper is dedicated to the memory of Rachel Nussbaum Wichert.
3. Ramona Ilea, From Pythagoras to Today: Animals and Philosophy 101, OUR HEN
HOUSE (Feb. 4, 2013), https://perma.cc/8Q6P-9USX; Joshua S. Sias, Ancient Animal Ethics:
The Earliest Arguments for the Ethical Consideration of Nonhuman Animals, 2 THE
DOWNTOWN REVIEW, Issue 1 at 1 (2016) (examining the status of animals ethics from the
time of the ancient Greeks to modern times).
4. Taimie L. Bryant, Symposium: Living on the Edge: The Margins of Legal
Personhood: Sacrificing the Sacrifice of Animals: Legal Personhood for Animals, the Status
of Animals as property, and the Presumed Primacy of Humans, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 247,
247 (2008).
5. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Animals as more than “Mere Things,” But Still Property:
A Call for Continuing Evolution of the Animal Welfare Paradigm, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023,
1025 (2016); Sias, supra note 3, at 1.
6. For a discussion and list of animal rights organizations and activists, see Animal
Rights Activists and Organizations, SPEAKING OF RESEARCH, https://perma.cc/DMB42XDV (Ironically, my organization, Friends of Animals, founded in 1957 was one of the
first groups to distinguish between animal welfare and rights, is not listed on this page.)
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awareness of the environmental and health benefits of a vegetarian or vegan
diet;7 convincing evidence that many animals are sentient;8 mainstream
media coverage of the lives of animals and human violence against them;9
and a surge in litigation over the legal status of animals like elephants,
chimpanzees, and whales.10
This public attention is leading to tangible changes in how animals are
perceived pragmatically, scientifically, and legally. Pragmatically, a
significant (and increasing) number of people are expressing their
indignation over the suffering animals endure at the hands of humans.11 In
recent years, we have seen deep public backlash to the continued use of
wild animals for entertainment,12 pets,13 and as hunting trophies.14 At the
same time, while humans continue to consume millions of farm animals
each year, there is a steady, appreciable decline in meat consumption in
many countries, including the United States.15
The scientific view of animals in our world is also greatly enlightened
today. Just a few decades ago, scientists largely viewed non-human animals

7. See e.g., James McWilliams, The Evidence for a Vegan Diet, THE ATLANTIC (Jan.
18, 2012), available at https://perma.cc/W7TY-BK6F.
8. See infra at Part C.
9. See infra notes 10-12.
10. See Cupp, supra note 5, at 1025 n. 1.
11. As recognized in a 2015 Gallup poll, today almost a third of Americans, 32%,
believe animals should be given the same rights as people, while 62% say they deserve some
protection but can still be used for the benefit of humans. Rebecca Riffkin, In U.S., More
People Say Animals Should Have Same Rights As People, GALLUP (May 18, 2015),
available at https://perma.cc/TZH3-4XSS; see also Cupp, supra note 5, at 1031–32.
12. Probably the most well-known example is the so-called “Blackfish Effect”,
involving public reaction to captivity of whales and other marine animals by SeaWorld and
other entertainment-based aquariums after the release of the 2013 documentary Blackfish.
See Mihir Zavari, SeaWorld Agrees to Pay $5 Million in ‘Blackfish Effect” Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 2018, at B3. Another example is the public outrage caused by the export
of 18 wild elephants from Eswatini to 3 U.S. zoos in 2016. See Tal Fox, American zoos fly
18 elephants out of Swaziland despite protests by animal rights campaigners, INDEPENDENT
(Mar. 12, 2016), https://perma.cc/XQ5W-29E4; Charles Siebert, The Swazi 17, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE, July 14, 2019, at 26.
13. See Erin Mulvaney, Bill would scratch big cats as pets, HOUSTON CHRONICLE
(Mar. 14, 2013), https://perma.cc/4KN4-5V4H; Should Exotic Animals be Kept as Pets?,
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Mar. 4, 2009), https://perma.cc/8KNZ-XKN8.
14. Jani Actman, Cecil the Lion Died Amid Controversy—Here’s What’s Happened
Since, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC (Oct. 15, 2018), https://perma.cc/HUN2-VGKZ (retelling the
story of the killing of Cecil the lion by U.S. dentist Walter Palmer, an act “sparking an
international outcry and greater scrutiny of trophy hunting for the heads, skins, or other body
parts of wild animals”); Nick Allen, Texas big game hunter Corey Knowlton kills black
rhino in Namibia, THE TELEGRAPH (May 20, 2015), https://perma.cc/C42A-6K72 (“The
hunter who received death threats after bidding $350,000 (£225,000) at auction for the right
to shoot the rare animal, killed it on camera.”).
15. Report: Meat in Decline, WORLD PRESERVATION FOUNDATION, https://perma.
cc/BF9H-6GFL.
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as mere “biological units” that required specific conditions—proper
habitat, foods, temperature, etc.—to successfully reproduce and maintain a
viable population.16 While some animals were proved more intelligent than
others, science greatly ignored any evidence of sentience, such as selfawareness, feelings, and emotions. While this type of scientific thinking
continues to exist, it is far more usual for a scientist to now view animals
as beings capable of living their own meaningful lives. This is exemplified
in the pioneering work of Frans de Waal17 and the modern field of
“Compassionate Conservationism.”18
Legally, animals are still given very little protection from harassment
or harm. There are very few examples of an animal being granted what we
might consider to be a legal right,19 with no such cases at all in the United
States.20 This is not to say, however, that judges, legislators, regulators, and
other legal officials are immune from the changing perception of animals.
Like in science, there is genuine evidence that the mindset toward animals
in the law is softening. Through refined word selections and modest
adjustments in status, recent legal proclamations about animals reflect
acceptance of their sentience. For example, while we have long had laws
that seek to prevent the physical infliction of pain on some domesticated
animals,21 we have seen recent bold attempts to legally prevent emotional
and psychological injury as well. This includes near outright bans on

16. See infra Part D.
17. See Mark Leviton, Not So Different After All: Frans de Wall On Animal
Intelligence and Emotion, THE SUN, July 2020, 5–15.
18. See MARC BEKOFF, REWILDING OUR HEARTS: BUILDING PATHWAYS OF
COMPASSION AND COEXISTENCE 78–83 (New World Library, 2014).
19.
A recent example is the 2019 decision by the High Court of Punjab and
Haryanain in India. In that case the court recognized under the Indian constitution all
animals in the animal kingdom, including avian and aquatic species, as legal entities.
Karnail Singh and Others v. State of Haryana, (2019) 533 CRR 2013 (Pun. & Har. HC)
(India).
20. See Cupp, infra note 5, at 1025–26.
21. See infra Part I. B.
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capturing some animals—whales,22 chimpanzees,23 and most recently
African elephants24—to force them into an undoubtedly miserable life of
captivity.
Given these encouraging developments, I would propose that an even
loftier goal is imaginable: there will soon be a generation of animals
roaming the Earth that represent the first of their species to have legal rights
and safeguards. That is, genuine laws preventing their mental, emotional,
social, and physical suffering at the hands of humans. This may not come
simultaneously for all animals, but it is certainly a vision for some species
that is no longer merely theoretical.
Now, I know what you are thinking. Humankind is simply incapable
of such a grand gesture to another species. Indeed, we have yet to extend
such a system of rights and safeguards equally among the members of our
own species. Yes, humans can be terrible, and at any point in time there is
ample evidence of this fact. There is also, however, a great deal of kindness
in us.25 Overall, our collective history has been one of working toward
(albeit in fits and starts) a system for ethical consideration for the wellbeing of other humans. And we are starting to see such considerations
extend to other animals.
What is needed, however, is an accelerant. An approach to animal
rights that will both bind and escalate the pragmatic, scientific, and legal
advancements experienced recently. There are many bidders for this honor.
The idea that animals feel pain and can suffer has long been considered an
22. In 2005, Costa Rica became the first country to ban cetacean captivity. Decree
Prohibits Capture of Whales and Dolphins, THE TICO TIMES (Aug. 26, 2005), https://perma.
cc/DV9M-BTBQ. California state imposed a similar ban in 2016. Protection of orcas:
unlawful activity, Cal. Legis. 2305 (2015-2016), https://perma.cc/4Z6A-GB88; Canada has
also banned cetaceans from being bred or kept in captivity. Amy Held, Canada Bans
Keeping Whales and Dolphins in Captivity, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, (June 11, 2019),
https://perma.cc/4P6T-S4ZD.
23. In 2015, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service listed all chimpanzees as endangered,
wherever found. Previously, FWS had separately classified captive and wild chimpanzees,
with the former not receiving the status of endangered. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 50 C.F.R.
§17.40 (2015), https://perma.cc/YR86-AFLF. Likewise, all African countries where
chimpanzees reside have laws in place to prevent capture and trade. Jason Goldman
Chimpanzees Should Not Be Used in TV or Movies SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN: THE THOUGHTFUL
ANIMAL (Oct. 12, 2011), https://perma.cc/883E-4JLG. Chimpanzees are awarded the
highest level of protection under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species (CITES) and can only be exported from West Africa under narrow exceptions.
David Shukman & Sam Piranty, The secret trade in baby chimps, BBC NEWS (Jan. 30,
2017), https://perma.cc/F8P7-Q42J.
24. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) recently
instituted a ban on taking baby African elephants from the wild and selling them to zoos.
Zoo trade in baby elephant banned internationally, BBC NEWS (Aug. 27, 2019), https://
perma.cc/Q7EU-VV4H.
25. See Eoin O’Carroll, Why Are Humans So Kind, Yet So Cruel?, THE CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR (Mar. 6, 2019), https://perma.cc/K3C4-JKLF.
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instrument for promoting their legal rights.26 The high levels of intelligence
that some non-human animals possess is yet another vehicle offered by
some theorists.27 More recently, arguments for legal personhood status
have been promoted based on evidence that some animals possess a high
sense of autonomy and self-awareness.28 All of these theories have been
extensively critiqued by scholars and practitioners, and no doubt all have
merits and flaws.
In this article, I propose an approach to animal rights that centers on
the idea of a right of ethical consideration. While this right is a legal one,
it is designed to draw upon the advancements of our scientific knowledge
of the emotional responses and social behaviors of other species. It is not
intended to require specific changes in human behavior toward animals (at
least not directly), but instead to fuel our practical understanding of the
meaningful lives of other animals. Simply put, we must develop a legal
system that obligates a more careful consideration of how our actions,
however beneficial to our species, may produce harm in the day-to-day
lives of other non-human animals.
Currently, the law only seeks to minimize the physical suffering or
death of an animal, or loss of an animal’s habitat, when sanctioning human
activity.29 Increasingly, however, we understand that our impact on
animals can include psychological and emotional harm. As Martha C.
Nussbaum would explain it, our current legal system fails to respect
species-specific, basic capabilities, whether bodily integrity, play,
sense/imagination/thought, emotion, practical reason, affiliation, or some
other capability unique to that animal.30
A right of ethical consideration as envisioned here is a legal obligation
on our governmental decision-makers (and perhaps corporations) to fully
examine how human actions degrade the types of lives animals are trying
to lead. Such a right is not based solely on our compassion or empathy for
an animal, but on moral and scientific principles that we can justify by
argument. Our decision-making processes must embrace our everexpanding knowledge of how human involvement or interference with an
animal diminishes one or more of that animal’s basic capabilities. In other
words, the reason to focus on the ethical treatment of animals is because of
them, not because of us. What we feel is neither here nor there. What
matters is the impact we have on an animal’s life—whether causing
physical, mental or emotional pain, or depriving that animal from
26. See infra Part II B (1).
27. See infra Part II. B (2).
28. See infra Part II. B (2).
29. See infra Part I. B.
30. Martha C. Nussbaum, Working with and for Animals: Getting the Theoretical
Framework Right with a Foreword By Michael Harris, 94 DENVER L. REV. 605, 621–23
(2017).
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connections and opportunities to live a better life. Whether we feel
compassion or not, we are morally obligated to prevent these impacts.
Finally, the right of ethical consideration I seek is not the granting of
specific substantive rights for animals, like the right to life, freedom, etc.
It is, however, a pathway to strengthening legal protections for animals and
future substantive, but appropriate, rights. By requiring decision-makers
and the public to engage in active deliberation about the human impact on
an animal’s ability to live a meaningful life, societal and legal beliefs
regarding the rights of non-human animals can more quickly change for the
better.
Part I of this paper will examine the current status of animals in our
legal system. Not surprisingly, these protections are thin. Most captive
animals are considered to be a form of property, while wild animals are free
only until their lawful capture (or death). Existing laws protect only a small
number of animals from acts of human cruelty toward them. Part II will
look at the early foundation of the animal rights movement, primarily
through the work of the philosophers. Part II will also consider some of the
modern legal theories for animal rights, including the notion of personhood.
A good deal of attention is provided to the capabilities approach, which I
consider to be an essential component of a right of ethical consideration.
Part III will present the fundamentals of a right of ethical consideration. It
is argued that such a right is built upon three tiers: philosophical conviction,
scientific imagination, and legal ingenuity. Finally, Part IV will consider
how a proposed right to consideration might stand up to the critique given
to other proposals for animal rights. I argue that the primary advantage a
right of ethical consideration has over other proposals, like personhood, is
that it does not invoke utilitarian arguments tying rights to individual
service to society. An animal is not entitled to ethical consideration
because it performs the rights and duties of personhood, but instead because
he or she has the ability function within her specific set of capabilities, and
to otherwise live a life of meaning.
I.

The Standing of Animals in the Law
A. Animals as Property

Any discussion regarding the standing of animals in the law must start
with the concept of property. Owned animals—those actually in the
possession of individuals, institutions, and corporations—are almost
universally considered to be a form of vested personal property.31 This
designation would apply to an individually owned pet, as well as to the

31.
76
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billions of animals used in the agricultural, entertainment, research, and
captive hunting industries.32
The more problematic property interest is that in wild animals. As the
Supreme Court recognized at the end of the nineteenth century in Geer v.
Connecticut, “[a] man may lastly have a qualified property in [wild]
animals feroe nature, propter privilegium, that is, he may have the privilege
of hunting, taking, and killing them in exclusion of other persons.”33 As
Justice Field describes this property interest in his dissent:
The wild bird in the air belongs to no one, but when the
fowler brings it to the earth and takes it into his possession it is his
property. He has reduced it to his control by his own labor, and
the law of nature and the law of society recognize his exclusive
right to it. The pearl at the bottom of the sea belongs to no one,
but the diver who enters the water and brings it to light has
property in the gem. He has by his own labor reduced it to
possession, and in all communities and by all law his right to it is
recognized. So, the trapper on the plains and the hunter in the
north have a property in the furs they have gathered, though the
animals from which they were taken roamed at large and belonged
to no one. They have added by their labor to the uses of man an
article promoting his comfort which, without that labor, would
have been lost to him. They have a right, therefore, to the furs,
and every court in Christendom would maintain it.34
The truth is, since Justinian times there has really been no serious legal
dispute that wild animals can be the property of individuals.35 Instead, what
was disputed is the extent to which a sovereign—the king or prince—may
hold original and perhaps superior title in them even before capture. Thus,
in some early “civilized” countries, a sovereign had the right to reserve wild
animals to himself and proscribe who had the right to hunt or capture wild
animals, as well as where such capture would be allowed.36 Geer itself is a

32. See generally, Karen Bradshaw, Animal Property Rights, 89 COLO. L. REV. 809,
818 (2018).
33. Geer v. State of Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 526-27 (1896) (quoting 2 Bl. Com.
394).
34. Id. at 540 (Field, J., dissenting).
35. See id. at 523 (quoting INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, Book 2, Tit. 1, s. 12).
36. See id. at 524 (quoting Pothier, TRAITE DU DROIT DE PROPREIETE, Nos. 27-28);
id. at 523 (noting that under the “ancient law of the continent of Europe . . . the right to
acquire animals feroe nature by possession was recognized as being subject to government
authority and under its power, not only as a matter of regulation, but also of absolute
control”).
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remnant of the debate of the sovereign’s superior claim in title to wild
animals in its jurisdiction.37
Today, “[a] State does not stand in the same position as the owner of
a private game preserve and it is pure fantasy to talk of ‘owning’ wild fish,
birds, or animals.”38 The “‘ownership language of cases like Geer are now
understood as no more than a 19th-century legal fiction expressing ‘the
importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and regulate
the exploitation of an important resource.’”39 Of course, a wild animal
living today is free only to the extent that he or she has yet to be subdued,
captured or killed by a human being under whatever regulatory scheme
enacted by the state in which the animal finds herself at the time.40 Thus,
even under this modern analysis, wild animals remain transient property.41
B. Legal Structures to Punish Cruel and In-Humane Treatment of
Animals
While animals are considered property—whether vested or
transient—they are not treated by our legal system the same as other forms
of personal property. Most of us are free to use and treat our appliances,
computers, and even cars in any destructive manner we see fit (except of
course to the peril of others). With animals we have managed to create a
legal (and moral) fiction that seeks to balance our ownership interest in
them with our knowledge that our actions can cause them inordinate pain

37. Geer addressed the constitutionality of a Connecticut statute that prohibited the
taking of certain bird species for the purpose of transporting them outside of the state. Id.
at 521. In essence, that state had asserted its control over these wild animals to condition
any subsequent property right that one might acquire from capturing or killing these birds.
Such interest prohibited one from causing the animal or its carcass from entering the stream
of interstate commerce. Id. at 530–31. Geer, which asserts a doctrine very close to the
absolute control over wild animals asserted by older European states, was overruled nearly
80 years later in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979).
38. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 334–35 (1979) (quoting Geer v. Connecticut, 161
U.S. 539-40 (Field, J., dissenting)).
39. Id. at 335 (citations omitted). A number of states, however, continue to codify
the notion of absolute ownership in their laws. See, e.g., Hollywood Park Humane Soc’y v.
Town of Hollywood Park, No. SA-03-CA-1312-XR, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 783, at *11
(W.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2004) (affirming a Texas statute that states, “all wild animals, furbearing animals, wild birds and wild fowl inside the borders of this state are the property of
the people of this state”).
40. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, State Hunting Licenses (Sept. 19, 2018),
https://perma.cc/7XAS-37YL.
41. Geer, 161 U.S. 519 at 527 (citations omitted) (The possessor “has a transient
property in these animals . . . so long as they continue within his liberty, and may restrain
any stranger from taking them therein; but the instant they depart into another liberty, this
qualified property ceases.”).
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and suffering. Professor Gary L. Francione has described this “moral
schizophrenia” about nonhuman animals this way:
Social attitudes about animals are hopelessly confused. On one
hand, many people regard at least some nonhumans—their “pets”
—as members of their families. On the other hand, these very same
people think nothing about eating animals other than “pets,” wearing
their skins, using them in experiments, or exploiting them for
entertainment in films, circuses, zoos, and rodeos. On one hand, we
all agree with the notion that it is morally wrong to inflict
“unnecessary” pain and suffering on nonhumans; on the other hand,
we routinely use animals in all sorts of contexts that could never be
considered as involving any coherent notion of necessity.42
This confusion has led us to enact a slew of animal welfare laws
designed to essentially categorize non-human animal cruelty into the
necessary (which is not prohibited) and the unnecessary (which is made
subject to some legal penalty).43 Thus, while today each of the fifty states
has an anti-cruelty law on the books,44 these laws protect only a small
number of animals and fail to constrain to any meaningful extent the overall
infliction of horrific suffering on animals.45 Only purposeful suffering of
specifically enumerated animals is banned.46 Kicking or intentionally
injuring a dog or house cat may be a crime, but the trapping, poisoning and
killing of mice, rats, raccoons, prairie dogs, and other animals is widely
accepted (and sometimes encouraged).47 Other animals, typically referred
to as game, are protected only to the form and timing of their killing.48 And

42. Francione, supra note 31, at ii.
43. See id. Citing Chief Justice Coleridge, Professor Francione puts it this way: “any
procedure ‘without which an animal cannot attain its full development or be fitted for its
ordinary use may fairly come within the term ‘necessary.’” Not ”every treatment of an
animal which inflicts pain, even great pain of mutilation, and which is cruel in the ordinary
sense of the word is necessarily” cruelty proscribed by law, which is only that pain inflicted
for ”only for pain inflicted for no legitimate purpose.” Id. (citations omitted).
44. Cupp, supra note 5, at 1032–33.
45. See Bryant, supra note 4, at 248.
46. Francione, supra note 31, at ii.
47. See, e.g., Taimie Bryant, Animals Modified: Defining Animals/Defining Human
Obligations to Animals, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 137, 151 (2006) (“Just as a rat is not an animal
when the law says she isn’t and is an animal when she says she is, a chicken is not legally
an animal unless a specific law defines chickens as animals.”).
48. This is typically done through individual state hunting, fishing and trapping laws.
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very few state laws regulate pain and suffering inflicted on the billions of
farm animals each year.49
Federal law is no better. Three laws primarily regulate the welfare of
captive animals. First, the federal Humane Methods of Slaughter Act
(“HMSA”),50 passed in 1958, requires that some animals be stunned into
unconsciousness before slaughter, to minimize pain.51 Not all animals that
we know feel pain are covered, however. Chickens, turkeys and other
birds, for instance, are exempt. Indeed, according to one estimate, the law
applies to “only about five percent of the close to 10 billion animals
slaughtered each year for food.”52
Second, is the Animal Welfare Act (“AWA”),53 enacted more than 50
years ago. As an initial critique, and perhaps because of the HMSA, the
AWA excludes from its coverage all animals raised for food.54 Even more
striking, the AWA also excludes 90% of animals used in research.55 As to
the estimated 250 species of animals that are covered, the law basically
deals only with their transportation and husbandry requirements.56 Perhaps
distilled to its essence, the AWA is nothing more than a set of minimum
standards for food and habitat requirements.
Still, over the course of its existence the AWA has routinely been
hailed as a “landmark” animal protection act.57 A more recent (and
accurate) critique of the AWA, however, exposes the law for what it really
is, “ineffective [and] worse, counterproductive.”58 As Professor Justin
Marceau explains it:
The AWA simplifies and entrenches the particular America
schizophrenia about animals—we love some like family, and treat
49. See Animal Welfare Institute, Legal Protections for Animals on Farms (Oct.
2018), available at https://perma.cc/475N-29PJ. There are some exceptions, such as
minimum cage and enclosure laws in some states for chickens and pigs. See, e.g., Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. § 69.25.107 (West); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 35-50.5-102 (West 2008).
Similarly, California has prohibited the production of foie gras. See Cal. Health & Safety
Code § 25982 (West 2008). However, a number of states have recently enacted so-called
Ag-Gag bills that criminalize undercover investigations of factory farms that report on
animal cruelty. Matthew S. Schwartz, Court Strikes Down Iowa’s ‘Ag-Gag’ Law That
Blocked Undercover Investigations, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Jan. 19, 2019). These laws
are being challenged (successfully) by animal advocates for violating the First Amendment
of the United States Constitution. Id.
50. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1902–1907 (2000).
51. Bryant, supra note 4, at 250–51.
52. Id.
53. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2159 (2012)
54. Justin Marceau, How the Animal Welfare Act Harms Animals, 69 HASTINGS L.J.
925, 930 (2018).
55. Bryant, supra note 4, at 249–50.
56. Id.
57. Marceau, supra note 54, at 927 n.3.
58. Id. at 927.
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many others like undifferentiated biomass that is well-suited for
food, entertainment, breeding, experimentation, and other uses
that bring us pleasure or perceived benefits. In this way, the AWA
is the ultimate wolf in sheep’s clothing. It has legitimized a vast
system of animal mistreatment, both through its exemptions and
the way it is applied, and it has facilitated the hijacking of the
concept “welfare” by the industries and researchers that are
regulated by the AWA.59
Third, is the recently enacted Preventing Animal Cruelty and Torture
Act (“PACT”).60 Signed into law in 2019, PACT strengthens many state
animal welfare laws by making some of the most egregious forms of animal
cruelty—specifically crushing, burning, drowning, suffocating, impaling or
sexual exploitation—in or affecting interstate commerce or within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States a federal crime.61 While PACT
answers the long-time call of animal advocates for broader federal
protection for animals,62 it also includes many of the same exceptions from
the AWA for “customary and normal” agricultural and veterinary
practices.63
As for wild animals, as noted above, modern laws at both the federal
and state level are largely designed to regulate the taking of so-called game
animals. Other laws, like the federal Endangered Species Act64 and the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act,65 seek to regulate human “take” of certain
species to prevent their extinction.66 In all, however, the laws that pertain
to wild animals are generally not focused on animal welfare, and are

59.
60.
61.
62.

Marceau, supra note 54, at 928.
18 U.S.C. § 48.
18 U.S.C. § 48(a)(1) – (3).
See, e.g., Marcia Clemmitt, Is the treatment of animals improving?, CQ
RESEARCH (Jan. 8, 2010), https://perma.cc/7J68-TY5X; Cara Feinberg, Are Animals
‘Things’?, HARVARD MAGAZINE (Mar. 2016), https://perma.cc/ZJC3-SJQF; Laws that
Protect Animals, ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, https://perma.cc/46N7-RP5J.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 48(d)(1)(a).
64. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544.
65. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712.
66. See, e.g., People for the Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners v. United States Fish
& Wildlife Serv., 852 F.3d 990, 994-95 (10th Cir. 2017) (“The purpose of the ESA is to
conserve endangered and threatened species and the ecosystems on which they depend.”
Further, “The ‘cornerstone’ of the ESA’s protections is a section prohibiting the take of any
endangered species without a permit or other authorization.”); Turtle Island Restoration
Network v. United States DOC, 878 F.3d 725, 749 (9th Cir. 2017) (J. Callahan, dissenting)
(“The Permit is consistent with this accommodation of competing statutory directives: it
allows for the take of migratory birds when paired with measures designed to minimize such
take. Neither CBD nor the majority contends that, if such measures are followed, the
MBTA’s broad goal of conserving migratory birds is threatened.”).
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designed to reduce pain and suffering only to the extent they codify what
some claim to be “humane hunting practices.”67
II.

Foundations of the Animal Rights Movement
A. Early Foundations

Kinship between humans and other animals in the natural world has
been a topic of philosophical discussion since ancient times. While
scholars think that Pythagoras is a figure of legend about whom nothing
solid is known,68 some see him among the earliest of advocates that nonhuman animals possess intelligence, rationality, and passion.69 These are
considered the elements of life that allow for sentience and that make the
mistreatment of non-human animals unethical.70 As one scholar observed:
“[f]or Pythagoras man was intimately linked with the rest of the animal
kingdom and did not enjoy innate superiority over the other animals. Man
was not the image of the divine, but a living being whose only
distinguishing characteristic was his greater ability to be trained and
participate in intelligence.”71
It is possible that these observations come from the later phase of his
school, and not directly from his writings. Even so, it is at least likely that
some of the earliest views about the kinship of species can be attributed to
Pythagoras.72
Aristotle’s thoughts on non-human animals are open to question by
some, but are often considered aligned with modern animal rights
advocacy. Rachel Nussbaum Wichert and Professor Martha C. Nussbaum
have described Aristotle as making “keen observations of animals” that
“led him to recognize many types of commonality between humans and
animals with respect to goal-directed practical reasoning and cognitively
rich emotions.”73 However, he did not say much about them ethically, and

67. See, e.g., Miles Olsen, Proper Shot Placement for Humane Hunting, MOTHER
EARTH NEWS (Feb. 2016), https://perma.cc/G3F4-SXU2.
68. Personal communication with Martha C. Nussbaum (Mar. 5, 2020) (on file with
author).
69. Sias, supra note 3, at 5.
70. Id.
71. PETER GORMAN, PYTHAGORAS: A LIFE 185 (Routledge 1979).
72. See WALTER BURKERT, LORE AND SCIENCE IN ANCIENT PYTHAGOREANISM
(Edwin L. Minar, Jr., 1972).
73. RACHEL NUSSBAUM WICHERT & MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, The Legal Status of
Whales and Dolphins: From Bentham to the Capabilities Approach, AGENCY AND
DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPMENT ETHICS 259, 271 (L. Keleher & S. Kosko eds., 2019)
(discussing Aristole’s “keen observations” on animals’ “practical reasoning and cognitively
rich emotions”).
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on occasion argued for human domain over other animals, as had
Socrates.74 As he explained in his Politics:
plants are for the sake of animals, and that the other animals
are for the sake of human beings, domestic ones both for using and
eating, and most but not all wild ones for food and other kinds of
support, so that clothes and other tools may be got from them. If
then nature makes nothing incomplete or pointless, it must have
made them for the sake of human beings.75
For Professor Nussbaum, the low standing of other animals in the
natural order and the lack of any ethical discourse by Aristotle is certainly
odd given his making such “keen observations” of animal reasoning and
emotions, but the two are not necessarily a contradiction. She rebuts, as
observed by one of her dissertation students, that “his criticisms of human
greed would at least lead in the direction of less-meat eating and other
abuses of animals.”76
Porphyry, a late Platonist wrote On Abstaining from Animal Flesh,
which still exists and has insightful things to say about the view of animals
in his day. This work is addressed to a friend and former vegetarian who
has resumed the consumption of meat.77 The work shows that Porphyry’s
abstinence from eating animals is motivated by the goal “of freeing oneself
from the body and the sensible realm as much as possible.”78 However, his
ethical concerns over eating animals is set forth as well. Porphyry accords
rationality to the animals and emphasizes what they have in common with
humans.79 He claims that it is plainly unjust to harm those who intend no
harm against us, and applies this standard to the animals.80 So his
vegetarianism is also a matter of justice and kinship.
Finally, animal ethics has been addressed by other historical thinkers
beginning with Descartes, who argued that animals, while at times acting
in sophisticated ways, could not feel pain and suffer.81 This assertion was
challenged by others that followed him, including Percy Shelly, Voltaire,
Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Gandhi, and Tolstoy. Each argued that

74. Sias, supra note 3, at 7–11.
75. POLITICS, op. cit., Book 1, Ch. 8, Lines 15–22.
76. Personal communication with Martha C. Nussbaum (Mar. 5, 2020) (on file with
author); Heather Battalay, Epistemic Self Indulgence, METAPHILOSOPHY, Vol 41 (2010)
(detailed discussion of this argument).
77. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (June 2015) available at https://perma.
cc/3JFW-TTUW.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Ilea, supra note 3.
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animals do suffer and feel pain and deserve to be treated well.82 Immanuel
Kant took a more middle-ground view on the moral status of non-human
animals. He argued while they do not have inherent value, hurting them
hurts humanity, and being kind to them benefits humanity.83
All of this historical reasoning has led over time to three modern
arguments to extending legal protections from mere welfare measures to
some form of equitable rights akin to those that many humans have today.
These arguments include: (1) the rationale of suffering; (2) the rationale of
autonomy; and (3) application of capabilities approach. We will look at
each of these briefly before moving into their application to a right of
ethical consideration for all animals.
B.Modern Foundations.
1. The Rationale of Suffering.
With respect to theoretical arguments for animal rights, the rationale
of suffering, pioneered by the utilitarian Jeremy Bentham, has led the
way.84 Bentham “famously” held that the only salient ethical facts for us
to understand are the presence of pleasure and pain.85 Accordingly, ethics
is “the art of directing man’s actions to the production of the greatest
possible quantity of happiness, on part of those whose interest is in view.”86
Importantly, Bentham did not feel constrained by the “conventional JudeoChristian views” of his time regarding animals.87 Instead, he recognized
that humans can direct their own actions or others, including “animals,
which on their own account of their interests having been neglected by the
insensibility of the ancient jurists, stand degraded into the class of things.”88
Bentham’s interest in reducing suffering and increasing pleasure, and not
on some notion of intelligence or reasoning, was clearly the basis for his
advocacy for animals. As he described it, “the question is not, [c]an they
reason? Nor, can they talk? but, [c]an they suffer?”89
We now believe that Bentham’s animal advocacy was not a mere part
of his larger repudiation of British attitudes that underlay Victorian views

82. Ilea, supra note 3.
83. Ilea, supra note 3; but see generally CHRISTINE KORGAARD, FELLOW CREATURES
(Oxford University Press, 2018) (acknowledging that Kant’s own views on animals are
narrow, but using Kantian material to construct a powerful narrative of animal ethics).
84. Nussbaum, supra note 30, at 617.
85. See id.
86. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 143 (Hafner Press 2007).
87. NUSSBAUM-WICHERT, supra note 73, at 266.
88. Id. (citing BENTHAM, supra note 86, at 144).
89. BENTHAM, supra note 86, at 311, n.1.
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of the human-animal divide. Instead, it appears to be a genuine interest in
animals, and their suffering. As Rachel Nussbaum-Wichert and Martha C.
Nussbaum explain:
But the interest of animals was very genuine: numerous remarks of
Bentham himself and his devoted editor John Bowring testified to his
fondness for wide range of animals, including cats, donkeys, pigs, and
mice. He cultivated a friendship with a pig who used to follow him around
on walks. A cat he named Reverend John Langborn used to eat macaroni
at the table with him. He loved to have mice play in his study and eat
crumbs from his lap. “I love everything that has four legs,” he wrote. He
used to call with dismay the cruelties that he himself had inflicted on
animals as a child, and the salutary effect that his uncle’s reproaches had
on him.90
While Bentham’s views would not be considered radical today—
while he rejected hunting and fishing for sport, he did not oppose the ethical
eating of animals91—it was certainly radical for his day. As
Gary
Francione explains, “Bentham’s position marked a sharp departure from a
cultural tradition that had never before regarded animals as other than
things to avoid morally significant interests . . . For Bentham, our treatment
of animals matters because of its effect on beings that can suffer, and our
duties are owed directly to them.”92 Most importantly, Bentham’s work
inspired many early animal welfare acts,93 and continues to be the basis for
many modern arguments for animal rights and elimination of the animals
as property paradigm.94
2. The Rationale of Intelligence.
John Stuart Mill, seeking to expand upon Bentham’s focus on
hedonism, provided, albeit unintendedly, a new rationale for the granting
of rights to non-human animals—intelligence. Mill believed that
Bentham’s focus on pleasure was too simplistic. Mill believed that
pleasures differ in quality as well as quantity and believed that mental
pleasures were superior to pleasures of the body.95 Mill did not appear to
have the same affection for animals, however. He generally believed that
animals lacked the capacity to experience the “higher” mental pleasures,
90.
91.
92.

NUSSBAUM-WICHERT, supra note 73, at 267.
Id. at 14.
GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS: PROPERTY OR PERSONS? ANIMAL RIGHTS:
CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 113 (Sunstein, C.R. and Nussbaum, M.C., eds.
Oxford University Press 1993).
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 7 (Harper 1975).
95. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM, UTILITARIANISM AND OTHER ESSAYS 279
(Alan Ryan ed., 1987).
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which were reserved (in line with the Victorian views of his time) for
humans.96
Mill ignores, however, the views of possibly Pythagoras and certainly
Aristotle that animals of many types exhibit intelligence and cognitive
capacity. Even if we attribute his view to a legitimate disagreement on the
issue, he is certainly refuted by modern science. As Rachel NussbaumWichert and Martha Nussbuam have observed, “a flood of new research on
the cognitive capacities of animals has made Aristotle’s insights impossible
to deny.”97 Just to mention the more well-known cases today, it is widely
known that the great apes, whales, and dolphins (among others)
demonstrate extremely high intelligence.98
These animals exhibit
“resourceful goal-directed behaviors,” forms of language, and “complex
forms of socially learned interactions amounting to culture.”99
Today, the rationale of intelligence is at the heart of a legal strategy,
closely associated with attorney Steven A. Wise, to emancipate captive
animals like chimpanzees and elephants in the United States.100 In both his
2001 book, Rattling the Case: Toward Legal Rights for Animals,101 and in
a 2016 documentary film about his work,102 Wise argues that certain
animals possess such similarities to human beings that negate any basis for
treating them differently than humans in the eyes of the law. As Martha C.
Nussbaum describes his work:
They are, he says, self-conscious, they are self-directing, they
have a theory of mind, they have culture, they are not ‘cabined by
instinct,’ they are able to contemplate their own future. In general,
they are ‘really, really smart.’ Centrally, he holds that they are
‘autonomous creatures’ who, for that reason, should have
‘autonomous lives.’103
In making these observations, Wise intends to show us that the line
we have drawn between humans and non-human animals is “irrational and
needs rethinking.”104 He does this through a series of well-thought-out

96.
97.
98.

NUSSBAUM-WICHERT, supra note 73, at 271.
Id.
See, e.g., id. at 21; see also Dina Spector, The Smartest Animals in the World,
BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 23, 2014), https://perma.cc/HM2D-FCN5.
99. Id.; see also infra Part III.C.
100. See Bryant, supra note 4, at 258.
101. See generally, STEVEN A. WISE, RATTLING THE CASE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS
FOR ANIMALS (Perseus Publishing, 1st ed. 2000).
102. Unlocking the Cage (HBO Documentary Films, Pennebaker Hegedus Films
2016).
103. Nussbaum, supra note 30, at 3.
104. Id. at 4.
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pieces of visual evidence that at their core other species can undertake
human-like activities, from using language to showing emotions.105 In this
sense, his work is designed to play off of our own desire to see human
attributes in certain non-human animals.
Wise’s work has been very important in the field of legal rights for
non-human animals, and certainly represents the forefront of the
“personhood” movement for some animal species.106 At the core of the
personhood movement is the belief that since the law gives
legal personhood to corporations, municipalities, and ships, it is immoral to
deprive the same liberty rights to certain animals.107 As Judge Fahey of the
New York Court of Appeals puts it:
Does an intelligent nonhuman animal who thinks and plans
and appreciates life as human beings do have the right to the
protection of the law against arbitrary cruelties and enforced
detentions visited on him or her? This is not merely a definitional
question, but the deep dilemma of the ethics and policy that
demands our attention. To treat a chimpanzee as if he or she had
no right to liberty protected by habeas corpus is to regard the
chimpanzee as entirely lacking independent worth, as a mere
resource for human use, a thing the value of which consists
exclusively in its usefulness to others. Instead, we should
consider whether a chimpanzee is an individual with inherent
value who has the right to be treated with respect.108
Unfortunately, it can be said that Wise’s work has often overaccentuated autonomy as the foundation for non-human legal rights.109
This has left him vulnerable to other aspects of granting legal status to nonhuman rights that need to be answered. For example, he has failed to

105. Nussbaum, supra note 30, at 6.
106. See Matter of Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 31 N.Y.3d 1054 (2018)
(habeas corpus proceedings on behalf of Tommy and Kiko, two captive chimpanzees);
Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. R.W. Commerford & Sons, Inc., 192 Conn. App. 36
(2019) (writ of habeas corpus on behalf of three elephants being held captive). Another
interesting personhood case is Tilikum ex rel. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals,
Inc. v. Sea World Parks & Entertainment, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 2d 1259 (S.D. Cal. 2012), which
sought declaratory and injunctive relief for being held by SeaWorld in violation of slavery
and involuntary servitude provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
107. See Angela Fernandez, Legal History and Rights for Nonhuman Animals: An
Interview with Steven M. Wise, 41 DALHOUSIE L.J. 197, 202–203 (2017); see also Will
Kymlicka, Social Membership: Animal Law Beyond the Property/Personhood Impasse, 40
DALHOUSIE L.J. 123, 130-34 (2017) (general discussion of personhood).
108. Matter of Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 31 N.Y.3d 1054, 1058
(2018).
109. See, e.g., Nussbaum, supra note 30, at 3–4.
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account for more utilitarian arguments for defining personhood. While a
court might be willing to accept and appreciate that a chimpanzee, for
instance, is self-aware and intelligent, the legal retort is that such an animal
is still not a person because it lacks the “capacity or ability . . . to bear legal
duties, or be held legally accountable for [its] actions.”110 Thus, the
argument goes, a corporation can be counted on to pay taxes and follow the
law, thus making it worthy of the privileges personhood bestows on it under
our legal system.
Similarly, Wise’s arguments don’t provide an adequate explanation
regarding what remedy should be available for an emancipated animal.
While he has made a compelling argument that some non-human animals
deserve more control over their lives, he has also argued that chimpanzees
are at the level of a 5-year old human child.111 And while no one would
argue that a 5-year old should not have some right of self-control, we
certainly would not set the child free. Instead, his position suggests he is
not arguing for actual legal rights, but instead for a new system of welfare
restrictions imposed on the animal’s guardian.
Finally, he has not adequately explained how his legal theory sets a
usable precedent for considering similar legal claims by other animals in
the future. On one hand, he acknowledges his work is “the first salvo” in a
strategic war.112 This strongly suggests he sees his cases as a first step
toward establishing rights for a broader range of species.113 On the other
hand, his focus on autonomy seems to validate the old idea of a scala
naturae with us at the top. In other words, after our dominance, some
animals might get more legal protections because they are like us; others,
perhaps less intelligent, will not. Martha C. Nussbaum has argued that such
thinking is not “just intellectually lazy and complacent,” but also
potentially “dangerous.”114 Among other things, she notes it leads us to
focus on “artificial performances” that may not be characteristic of the life
a species actually lives in the wild.115 Thus, she has recently worked to
apply her version of the Capabilities Approach to animals, arguing it is
more inclusive and respectful of the diversity of animal lives.

110. Matter of Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., 152 A.D.3d at 78.
111. See Nussbaum, supra note 30, at 3.
112. Id. at 6.
113. See Greg Norman, Fresh Off Seaworld Victory, Animal Rights Groups Take
Aim at Zoos, Circuses And Maybe Your Pet, FOX NEWS (Apr. 26, 2016), https://perma.
cc/VBQ9YLUF (opponents of animal rights certainly think it is a slippery slope).
114. See Nussbaum, supra note 30, at 17.
115. Id. at 9.
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3. The Capabilities Approach
The Capabilities Approach was developed with only the human case
in mind. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
The capability approach is a theoretical framework that entails
two core normative claims: first, the claim that the freedom to
achieve well-being is of primary moral importance, and second, that
freedom to achieve well-being is to be understood in terms of
people’s capabilities, that is, their real opportunities to do and be
what they have reason to value. The approach has been developed
in a variety of more specific normative theories, such as (partial)
theories of social justice or accounts of development ethics.116
The Capabilities Approach argues that in looking at how well a group
of humans is doing the focus should not be on average utility.117 Rather,
the right question to ask is, ‘How well are the individuals able to do and be
in areas important to their lives?’118 The answer to that question is the
account of that individual’s capabilities.119
Martha C. Nussbaum has developed a version of the Capabilities
Approach that creates a partial approach to basic social justice and human
rights.120 She has developed a list of ten capabilities that she argues must
be secured up to a minimum level for individuals within the group for that
group to have any claim to justice: Life; Bodily Health; Bodily Integrity;
Senses, Imagination and Thought; Emotions; Practical Reason; Affiliation;
Connection to Other Species; Play; and Control Over One’s
Environment.121
Turning to animals, Nussbaum has argued that dignity is not just a
human right but belongs to other animals as well. In her view, “all are
worthy of lives commensurate with the many types of dignity inherent in
their own forms of life. All animals, in short, should have a shot at
flourishing in their own way.”122 Most importantly, and what sets her
approach apart from others, she recognizes that:

116. The Capability Approach, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Oct. 3,
2016) https://perma.cc/5G7A-TBFJ.
117. AMARTYA SEN, PREFACE TO COMMODITIES AND COMMONALITIES PREFACE
(Oxford University Press, 1999) (1987).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE
CAPABILITIES APPROACH 4 (Cambridge University Press, 2000).
121. Nussbaum, supra note 117, at 78–80.
122. Id. at 17.
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“[each] creature [ ] deserves ethical consideration for what it
is, and a kind of constitution that specifies what harms it should not
be permitted to suffer—not in terms of its likeness to humans or its
possession of some least-common-denominator property—but in
terms of what it is itself, the form of life it leads.”123
In other words, capabilities are species-specific.
In this regard, while recognizing that even some of the ten “human”
basic capabilities she has identified might apply to some non-human
species,124 she advocates for similar lists of capabilities for other animals.
While not providing such lists, she does provide us with a number of
questions to consider:
What life span is normal for that species in the wild? What is
the physical condition of the healthy animal? What human [or nonhuman] acts invade or impair the bodily integrity of that sort of
animal? What types of movement from place to place are normal
and more pleasurable for that sort of animal? What sensory and
imaginative stimulation does this animal seek, and what is it to keep
the animal in an unacceptably deficient sensory environment?
What is it for this sort of animal to live in a crippling and intolerable
fear or depression, or with a lack of bonds of concern? What type
of affiliations does this animal seek in the wild, what sorts of
groups, both reproductive and social, does it form? What types of
communication does the animal engage in, using what sensory
modalities? What is it for the animal to be humiliated and
disrespected? What is it for the animal to play and enjoy itself?
Does the animal have meaningful relationships with other species
and the world of nature? What type of objects does the animal use
and need to control if it is to live its life?125
Nussbaum does not purport to answer these questions for each species,
or to determine how species-specific capabilities should be addressed by
the law.126 These are questions that beg for a system that can be applied by
compassionate conservationists and animal rights advocates in the future.
A system like the right of ethical consideration, to which I now turn.

123. Nussbaum, supra note 117, at 18–19.
124. Id. at 17. For example, she points to connection with other species and practical
reason. For reasons discussed below, I would argue that for some species there is also
overlap with bodily health, bodily integrity, sense, imagination and thought, emotions,
affiliation, and certainly play.
125. Id. at 18.
126. Id. at 19.
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III. A Right of Ethical Consideration for All Animals “All Life Is
Holy:”127 The Need for Humans to Re-Communion with other Sentient
Creatures.
According to Nalungiaq, a Netsilik Inuit, “[i]n the very earliest time,
when both people and animals lived on earth, a person could become an
animal if he wanted to and an animal could become a human being.
Sometimes they were people, and sometimes animals and there was no
difference. All spoke the same language.”128 This passage should serve to
remind us of that intuitive feeling that there is a profound connection
between the human mind and the natural world. Indeed, we share DNA
with every creature that ever walked, crawled, flew, or swam on the
Earth.129 Building in complexity over billions of years, human DNA today
not only contains our species and individual traits, but also the seed for the
intuitive senses that all life needs to survive.130 For humans, and likely for
many other species on the planet, when properly nurtured, these senses
appear designed to favor, among other things, “living in peace with [the]
world,” not as masters over other living things, but as guests among
others.131 As the late Professor Paul Shepard explains:
For the infant as person to be, the shape of all otherness grows
out of that maternal relationship. Yet the setting of that
relationship was, in the evolution of humankind, a surround of
living plants, rich in texture, smell, and motion, the unfiltered,
unpolluted air, the flicker of wild birds, real sunshine and rain,
mud to be tasted and tree bark to grasp, the sounds of winds and
water, the voices of animals and insects and humans—all of these
are not vague and pleasant amenities for the infant, but the stuff
which is second grounding, even while in its mother’s arms, has
begun.132

127. SURVEYING THE LITERARY LANDSCAPES OF TERRY TEMPEST WILLIAMS 129
(Katherine R. Chandler, et al. eds., 2008).
128. RUTH FINNEGAN, SYMPOSIUM OF THE WHOLE: A RANGE OF DISCOURSE TOWARD
AN ETHNOPOETICS 3 (Jerome Rothenberg et al. eds., 1983).
129. Ker Than, All Species Evolved From a Single Cell, Study Finds, NATIONAL
GEOGRAPHIC (May 14, 2010), https://perma.cc/ZV5F-GKGP.
130. See, e.g., PAUL SHEPARD, NATURE AND MADNESS 6 (Athens: University of
Georgia Press, 1982) (recognizing that the “seed of normal ontogeny is present in all of us”).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 7.
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Some indigenous cultures, and more holistic religions, like Buddhism
and Hinduism, have retained these beliefs and way of life.133 Elsewhere,
particularly in what is called the West, so-called civilized cultures have
largely abandoned the “ceremonies” of infant nurturing aimed at affirming
“the metaphoric, mysterious, and poetic qualities of nature” already fixed
in our body and mind through evolution.134
An early, yet often unexamined acknowledgement of the dissolution
of human union with nature and other animals is found in the intricate
writings of Alain de Lille (or Alan of Lille), a French theologian and poet
born near the end of the dark ages.135 One scholar who has dissected these
writings, Wendell Berry, recounts Alan’s telling of his dream-vision
conversing with Nature, whom he recognizes both as his “kinswoman” and
as the Vicar of God.136 In his interpretation of Alan’s work (De planctu
Naturae (On the Plaint of Nature), Berry states that through his vision, Alan
is told by Nature (his “great instructor”) that: the integrity of the natural
world depends on the maintenance by humans of their integrity by practice
of the virtues. The integrities are interdependent. They cannot be separated
and they must not be separately thought about.137
Berry notes that these virtues—which were defined by Alan to include
the practice of chastity, temperance, generosity, and humility138—are
certainly high standards that have not been met by the humans of the
industrial age.139 But perhaps more importantly, it appears that the point of
Alan’s “vision” is that they were already not being properly practiced by
humans in his time, with a very grave outcome for the relationship between
humans and the non-human world, including other animals. According to
Berry, in Alan’s mind, our abstention from the virtues severed our intuitive
link with Nature. As he puts it:
Intuition tells us, and has told maybe as long as we have been
human, that the nature of the world is a great being, the one being
used in which all other beings, living and not living our joy. And
133. See Annie Sneed, What Conservation Efforts can Learn from Indigenous
Communities, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (May 29, 2019), https://perma.cc/DLM9-2KRU;
Priscilla Tay, Can Religion Teach Us to Protect Our Environment? Analyzing the Case of
Hinduism, ETHICS & INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (Apr. 2019), https://perma.cc/C4PX-Y6K2.
For an in-depth examination of the rule of nature within Buddhism and Hinduism, see
Rhyddhi Chakraborty, Insight of Hinduism and Buddhism: A Study of the Possible Remedies
for Deep Ecological Problems (Aug. 2015).
134. SHEPARD supra note 130, at 5–7.
135. WENDELL BERRY, The Presence of Nature in the Natural World: A Long
Conversation, A SMALL PORCH 83–90 (Counterpoint 2016).
136. Id. at 83.
137. Id. at 86.
138. Id. at 84.
139. Id. at 86.
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for his longest time, in our tradition, we have called this being
“Natura,” or “Kind” or “Nature.” And if we forget, our language
remembers for us the relation of “natural” (by the way of “kind”) to
“kindness” and “kin,” and to “natal,” “native,” nativity,” and
“nation.” Moreover, as understood by Alan of Lille and the poets
who descend from him, the being and the name of “Nature” also
implicates the history of human responsibility towards the being of
all things, in nature’s continuing requirement about responsibility.140
Simply put, whether found in Alan’s vision, the stories of indigenous
peoples, or in centuries of philosophical and spiritual wittings, there is the
ability for tenderness in us toward the most vulnerable animals among us.
Whether or not tied to the non-practice of virtutes, many modern cultures
have turned away from this aspect of our being, having created a social
norm where love and compassion are attributes that we habitually claim,
but mostly fail to practice. Again, as Paul Shepard tells us, from a
standpoint of human evolution (both biological and, relatedly, culturally),
many humans today are simply deprived from becoming the mature
individuals we should be in order to “handle our responsibilities to things
wild.”141 Of course, given our ties to life on this planet, both through
genetics, and more recently a shared history, “there is a secret person
undamaged in each of us.”142 If we could once again properly nourish that
secret soul, perhaps we can then re-communion with other life on Earth.
Thus, a right of ethical consideration is an approach for us to again
become conscious of the undeniable connection between us and all living
things. It requires us to not only ask what it means for other animals to live
a meaningful life, but also for us to offer up for examination how our
proposed, future decisions might impact those lives. Time and time again,
those who have seriously examined these questions objectively, and with
an open heart, have come to similar conclusions, namely, that our
“assumption of separation and even superiority is just that.”143 But it’s not
enough to have an occasional thinker reach such a moral position. We need
a broader effort to create the collective human will to turn an intangible
moral conviction into an operable code that requires animals be given the

140. BERRY, supra note 135, at 89–90. Interesting, the practice of virtues remains
at the heart of other cultures and religions that have retained their connection with nature
and other animals. See, e.g., NICHOLAS F. GIER, DHARMA MORALITY AS VIRTUE ETHICS,
INDIAN ETHICS (Purusottama Bilimoria et al. eds., Springer, 2009).
141. Keith Schneider, Nature and Madness (reviewing PAUL SHEPARD, NATURE AND
MADNESS (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1982)) https://perma.cc/YD8R7AE9.
142. SHEPARD, supra note 130, at 129.
143. Marc Bekoff, How to Make the World Better for Nonhuman Animals,
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Dec. 17, 2017) https://perma.cc/479Q-SKH6 (quote by Howard
Garrett of the Orca Network).
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appropriate level of respect and dignity in our societal decision-making
processes.
Unfortunately, left unaided, it has proven very difficult for us to
establish such an ethic, let alone regain that instinctive connection to the
natural world. We have established hardened institutional lines—religious,
economic, cultural, and legal—between the human and other world. Those
who benefit from the status quo will certainly do their best to discourage
any attempt to rekindle our moral connections, and responsibility, to nonhuman animals and the environment. But the truth is the more we learn
about those connections, and about the lives of others, the more we tend to
see that those institutional lines are barriers to a better world for all of us.
In other words, the more we can engage in methodical, shared ethical
consideration of other animals, the more likely we will be to change our
harmful behavior towards others and perhaps someday even grant specific,
yet appropriate, rights to non-human animals.
In my mind, such an effort requires collaboration of three disciplines,
philosophy (and in particular the Capabilities Approach), science, and law
to help us determine, perhaps on a case-by-case base, what an animal needs
to live a meaningful life. Each of these disciplines offers an important
foundation for a right of ethical consideration, all of which are necessary to
change our social attitudes toward non-human animals. Let us consider the
significance of each.
B.The First Tier of a Right of Ethical Consideration: Philosophical
Conviction.
Perhaps the work of the Philadelphia Quaker William Bartram, one of
America’s most influential naturalists of the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, best illustrates the importance of philosophy for a
modern right of ethical consideration. Bartram proposes that human
behavior points to the existence of a faculty of reason, and that one function
of reason is moral awareness.144 He further offers us the following, “what
is ethically appropriate for one rational agent is appropriate for all rational
agents.”145 In other words, humans have an obligation “to promote the
flourishing of other” in our moral community, which would include all
sentient actors, human and non-human alike.146 Humans, of course, are (so
far) the only mega-rational animal capable of making moral choices
regarding the lives of other living things.

144. See Kerry S. Walters, The “Peaceable Disposition” of Animals: William
Bartram on the Moral Sensibility of Brute Creation, 56 PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY 157, 168
(July 1989).
145. Id.
146. Id.
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This supposition is again echoed nearly a century and half later in the
works of semioethicists, like John Deely and Morten Tønnessen. Here the
belief is that all living things are semiosic.147 That is, all living things
contribute meaningfully to dynamic systems of signification within their
environments.148 Deely has in particular emphasized a distinction between
those living beings with moral standing in their environment, and the
uniquely human domain of moral agents (capable of moral evaluation).
What matters then are ethical obligations. In his words, “[h]uman animals
not only are unique in having responsibilities, but also in the extent of those
responsibilities: for we have learned through and on the basis of semiosis
become ‘metasemiosis’ or semiotics that our interactions involve us in the
whole of Gaia, not just the human socio-cultural sphere.”149Accordingly,
for Deely, “semioethics . . . springs from the discovery that the human
being has responsibility that goes beyond the human world.”150
Of course, the question remains, with respect to the non-human animal
world, or what Bartram would call brute creation, as to whether other
animals are actually similarly endowed with rationality, and, thus, entitled
to “the same right of ethical consideration as other members of the moral
community?”151 Semioethicists could certainly make the case that
participation by a living thing in a system of signs alone demonstrates, as
suggested by John Locke, a life of reason and logic (rationality).152 Or,
from Bartram’s perspective, we can appeal to “those actions and
movements of animals which they have in common with us.”153 Finding
little difference between such actions, “why, then, have we not every reason
to believe that those actions and movements are excited and proceed from
the same [rational] motives or cause?”154
Thus, on one hand, even without scientific inquiry, animals appear to
“behave in purposeful, creative ways,” and are capable of activities
displaying utility, beauty and orderliness.155 In line with Nussbaum’s view
of the Capabilities Approach, while each species might have a unique set
147. See, e.g., Jonathan Beever & Morten Tønnessen, Justifying Moral Standing by
Biosemiotic Particularism, 37 SEMIOTIK 31, 32 (2015).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 34.
150. Tell me, where is morality bred? The Semioethics Interviews I: John Deely, 4
HORTUS SEMIOTICUS (2009), available at https://perma.cc/HVD9-SX5R.
151. Walters, supra note 144, at 168.
152. THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE. A NEW EDITION, CORRECTED. IN TEN VOLUMES, 4
at 175 (London 1963) (Thirdly, the third branch [of sciences] may be termed σημειωτικὴ
[Semeiotike], or the doctrine of signs, the most usual whereof being words, it is aptly enough
termed also Λογικὴ, logic; the business whereof is to consider the nature of signs the mind
makes use of for the understanding of things, or conveying its knowledge to others.).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 169.
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of capabilities, animals, when examined, demonstrate certain functions
that, when allowed to be exercised, contribute to their well-being (and
presumably a happier life). After centuries of debate, today we can assert
with philosophical conviction that non-human animals possess such
capabilities, and that they therefore deserve some level of ethical
consideration. I do believe, however, that philosophy alone does not
compel a basic right of ethical consideration. But it does establish a moral
basis requiring us to make a scientific inquiry into what animals need to
live meaningful lives, and how human actions facilitate or impede the
capabilities of others. So, let us look at the second tier, scientific
imagination.
C.The Second Tier of a Right of Ethical Consideration: Scientific
Imagination.
Today, it would be almost unimaginable for the family doctor, when
asked to consider our overall health and well-being, to simply poke and
prod us physically, while completely ignoring our emotional and mental
health. We are holistic beings—physical ailments can affect our mental
fitness and mental stressors can make us physically ill.156 Yet, less than a
century ago, from a medical profession standpoint, this was not the norm.
Many medical doctors were, by in large, only interested in examining and
treating the physical manifestations of our well-being. Can the problem be
diagnosed and treated through physical examination? Can it be cut out of
us or treated with medication? These questions were within the province
of the doctor. The problems of the head and heart—mental and emotional
well-being—were left for the “softer-side” of science, like psychology.157
We are currently emerging from a similar age of denialism in animal
science. For the longest time, science has depicted animals as “stimulus-

156. Mental Illness, Mayo Clinic (last visited Sept. 26, 2020), https://perma.
cc/H47A-G4HN (the field of medicine now recognizes the intimate link between a person’s
mental state and their physical health. People who have chronic illnesses such as diabetes,
heart disease, or rheumatoid arthritis commonly develop depression. Similarly, people with
depression can often develop physical symptoms such as back pain, headaches, and fatigue);
Chronic Illness and Mental Health, National Institute of Mental Health (last visited Sept.
26, 2020), https://perma.cc/NJW9-ELJ7.
157. While on one hand doctors largely ignored aspects of patient’s emotional wellbeing, any attention toward mental states focused on alleged physical bases. Lobotomies
were conducted as late as the 1980s in America to deal with mental illness. Health
Psychology has emerged as a field in the last thirty or so years, and doctors recognize that
many problems with physical symptoms are not somatic in nature. See, e.g., Luigi Solano
et al., The family physician and the psychologist in the office together, 6 MENT. HEALTH
FAM. MED. 91 (2009); Heather Stringer, Training physicians to see psychology in medicine,
50 AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N 60 (Mar. 2019).
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response machines while declaring their inner lives barren.”158 As James
C. Ha and Tracy L. Campion, recently described it:
In the not so distant past, the idea that animals were capable
of feeling “emotions” was unorthodox, at best, and blasphemous,
at worst, and ethologists have long struggled with conflicting
schools of thought. While Darwin was one of the first scientists to
write about the emotional lives of nonhuman animals, most early
scientists and philosophers (and philosopher-scientists) were
animal emotion denialists, and none of them more so than Rene
Descartes. Descartes postulated that animals were “automata,”
beings that behaved in ways that gave the false appearance of
emotion and consciousness, but who were, in fact, merely
mechanistic. But in the centuries since the “dark ages” of animal
science, new hypotheses have been presented, suggesting that
there’s not only ample scientific evidence of emotion in animals
that are seen as “complex” and “charismatic,” such as dolphins,
nonhuman apes, elephants, and dogs, but even among insects, who
have some of the most simplistic neural circuitry.159
Thus, for a large part of the two centuries, animal sciences were rooted
in biology. This was true even for ethology, the study of animal behavior,
which long considered animal behavior to be an evolutionarily adaptive
trait.160 At best, psychologists believed such behavior could be influenced
by associative learning, but there was certainly no such thing as animal
cognition and emotion.161
Today, however, this is changing. While we cannot be 100% sure
what human or non-human animals actually feel, the “weight of the
evidence from evolutionary biology and large bodies of detailed
comparative evidence, together with grounded common sense, all indicate
with high probability that animals with nervous systems are indeed sentient,
meaning that they feel.”162 Of course, this is also what philosophers were
158. Frans de Waal, Your Dog Feels as Guilty as She Looks, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8,
2019), https://perma.cc/TM9K-HLDD.
159. See generally James C. Ha & Tracy L. Campion, The Emotional Animal: Using
the Science Of Emotions to Interpret Behavior, DOG BEHAVIOR (Academic Press 2019).
160. Definition of ethology, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://perma.cc/S5LL-BSVL (last
visited Sept. 26, 2020).
161. Leviton, supra note 17, at 7; Wall, supra note 158, at 7 (Indeed, as Frans de
Wall explains, “It wasn’t until the 1990s that we finally started to win the battle with the
behaviorists, and those that talked about animal cognition got a foothold and got funding for
experiments”).
162. Marc Bekoff & Jessica Pierce, Animal welfare cannot adequately protect
nonhuman animals: The need for a science of animal well-being, 1 ANIMAL SENTIENCE 7(2)
(2016).
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telling us long ago, what Darwin seemed to believe163 and what Bartram
concluded through his own powers of observation.164 In short, other
animals display emotions, invent, act purposefully, teach, learn, and adapt.
What is currently happening is what Dr. Marc Bekoff calls
“naturalizing the study of animal emotions.”165 Bekoff and his colleague
Jessica Pierce call this emerging scientific change “compassionate
conservation.”166
Scientific research that helps us understand the lives of wild animals
is vitally important, as are the intentional conservation efforts to protect
them. The science of animal well-being challenges us to explore ways in
which we can be less selfish and violent in our relationships with animals.
It focuses attention on individual animals themselves and what they need
and want, not just what we need and want. It seeks first and foremost to
avoid harming animals, and encourages creative thinking about how to
protect the integrity and freedom of animals.167
Compassionate conservation proposes that conservation ethics should
consider animals as individuals, not just members of populations of
species.168 It means using empathy for non-human animals and striving to
reduce the harm we humans can cause to them.169 But the real gift
compassionate conservationism gives us is the license for science to be
more imaginative. Researchers are rapidly gathering ample evidence, and
new data is constantly accumulating, to support arguments that many, if not
all, animals have deep, rich, and complex emotional lives.170 One only
needs to tune into both the popular media and scientific news outlets to see
these advancements in the headlines on a near weekly basis.171 For those
who pay attention, the discoveries are truly startling. It is not just the
elephants, whales, dolphins and apes of our world that make news about
their cognitive, social and emotional lives. The list also includes all types
of birds, mammals, insects, and fish species. Perhaps most importantly,
with the door open to the study of the meaningful lives of animals, the field

163. CHARLES DARWIN, THE EXPRESSION OF THE EMOTIONS IN MAN AND ANIMALS 73,
100 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009).
164. Walters, supra note 144, at 170–71.
165. Marc Bekoff, Animal Emotions: Exploring Passionate Natures 50 BIOSCIENCE
861, 861 (2000).
166. Id.
167. MARC BEKOFF & JESSICA PIERCE, THE ANIMALS’ AGENDA: FREEDOM,
COMPASSION AND COEXISTENCE IN THE HUMAN AGE 164 (Beacon Press, 2017).
168. Vanessa Souza Soriano et al., Compassionate Conservation: Concept and
Applications, 22 ARCHIVES OF VETERINARY SCIENCE 116, 118 (2017).
169. Id.
170. Bekoff, supra note 165, at 862.
171. See, e.g., Bekoff & Pierce, supra note 166, at 1–2.
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of study is expanding to include more traditional, “hard” sciences, like
neurobiology.172
Today we live in a world where animal science is no longer bound
exclusively to the principles of physiology. Scientists are instead
encouraged to “pay closer attention to anecdotes along with empirical data
and philosophical arguments as heuristics for future research.”173 We can
combine the “hard” and “soft” interdisciplinary research necessary to
advance the study of animal emotions. This gives us the opportunity to
begin engaging in the inquiry set forth by Nussbaum,174 and begin forming
a set of species-specific capabilities. Perhaps this coupling of philosophical
thought and scientific knowledge can then form the basis for reforming our
legal system to better ensure ethical consideration (and perhaps justice) for
non-human animals. Let us then turn to the final tier—our system of laws
and justice.
D.The Third Tier of a Right of Ethical Consideration: Legal Ingenuity
1. Can the Existing Legal Framework be Used to Advance a Right of
Ethical Consideration for Non-human Animals?
Unlike modern philosophical and scientific thinking regarding animal
sentience, the law, as it pertains to animals, remains a relic of the
unenlightened thinking of the past. We have already seen that our animal
welfare laws apply only to a handful of captive animals, and even then,
really only seek to minimize physical, and not mental, suffering.175 For
wild animals, the law continues to regard them merely as biological units.
Take the Endangered Species Act, for instance, widely considered the jewel

172. In 2012, a prominent group of international cognitive neuroscientists,
neuropharmacologists, neurophysiologists, neuroanatomists, and computational
neuroscientists gathered at the University of Cambridge and concluded that, “Convergent
evidence indicates that non-human animals have the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and
neurophysiological substrates of conscious states along with the capacity to exhibit
intentional behaviors. Consequently, the weight of evidence indicates that humans are not
unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Nonhuman
animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including octopuses,
also possess these neurological substrates.” The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness
(July 7, 2012), https://perma.cc/MY9A-LZW6; see also Jaak Panksepp, Cross-Species
Affective Neuroscience Decoding of the Primal Affective Experiences of Humans and
Related Animals, 6 PLOS One 1 (Sept. 7, 2011).
173. See Bekoff, supra note 165, at 863.
174. See Nussbaum, supra note 27, at 18.
175. See supra Part I. B.
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of all wildlife law.176 The statute itself does not even once use the word
“animal,” instead setting forth broad principles of species and habitat
conservation to ensure “viable” populations.177 Not a single federal wildlife
statute expressly provides any protection for the social structures, or
emotional well-being of any wild animal.178 This is despite the obvious fact
that a viable animal population—one that has the minimum conditions
necessary for survival and reproduction—does not in turn mean a happy
population, where each animal is able to function within its capabilities.
There are, however, a number of statutes that might serve as an initial
point for a new right of ethical consideration. These statutes can be referred
to as informational in nature. Some of these laws require that the
government disseminate and consider relevant information about the
impacts of human activity on the natural world, like the National
Environmental Policy Act.179 Others require that information distributed
for commercial purposes be truthful, or at least not intentionally
misleading, like false claim acts and consumer right-to-know statutes.180
Another possible example is cost benefit analysis, which by presidential
order has applied for decades to a vast majority of regulations and projects
proposed by the federal government.181 Such analysis is a formal technique

176. See, e.g., Michael Bean, The Endangered Species Act: Science, Policy, and
Politics, 1162 ANNALS OF THE NEW YORK ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 369 (2009); U.S. Dept. of
Interior, 10 of the Greatest #WildlifeWin Stories of All Time, https://perma.cc/KJN5-HSHP;
Lisa Friedman, U.S. Significantly Weakens Endangered Species Act, THE NEW YORK TIMES
(Aug. 12, 2019), https://perma.cc/85SW-H4W4.
177. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544. “The purposes of [the ESA] are to provide a means
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may
be conserved, to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered species and
threatened species…” Id. The ESA requires federal agencies to ensure that actions they
authorize are not likely to jeopardize the existence of any listed species, “take” any
individual of a listed species, or result in destruction of any habitat of listed species.
178. See Sorano et al., supra note 167, at 118–19 (suggesting that the closest any
wildlife law may come to going beyond concern for species or population level is the US
Marine Mammal Protection Act which basis protections “on individual behavioral
characteristics”).
179. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 – 4370. NEPA, like the ESA, requires that federal agencies
review their proposed actions before making any final decisions. NEPA, however, forces
agencies to consider the environment and any significant effects the proposed action may
have on the environment. Unlike the ESA, NEPA is less concerned with results than with
process: agencies must take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences and, where
practicable, mitigate environmental harm.
180. Federal legislation in this category include, inter alia, the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58, the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733, and
the Emergency Planning and Right to Know Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050.
181. For a history of cost benefit analysis within the U.S. Executive Branch, see C.
Boyden Gray, The President’s Constitutional Power to Order Cost-Benefit Analysis and
Centralized Review of Independent Agency Rulemaking, MERCATUS WORKING PAPER
GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY (2017).
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for comparatively assessing the costs and benefits of an activity or project
over a relevant time period.182 To date, these laws have not been tested
appropriately as vehicles to examine how human action affects the social,
cultural, emotional, and other capabilities of animals.
Now, the dissemination of truthful information is itself not a
substantive protection. Broader knowledge about how our actions
specifically affect the meaningful lives of other animals is not going to
make life better for the creatures we harm. But the proper use of
information in public decision-making processes can lay the foundation for
change. The purpose for these information-based laws in the first place is
not solely to ensure accurate information, but “a decision-making
procedure which emphasizes the process of free and fair deliberation
among individuals where their preferences and value orientations are
debated with a focus on the need to realize the common good.”183 Likewise,
requiring accurate information be distributed in public spheres—political
and economic—is a means to ensure that individual actors are inclined to
make more ethical or reasonable judgments when given the opportunity in
a public sphere to reflect about the whole environment as a common good.
This is particularly true when the public forum allows others to challenge
their potentially narrow, self-interested viewpoints.184 Finally, we know
from experience that as information is disseminated and the impacts of
human action on a particular group become increasingly indisputable, our
laws often change to provide new substantive protections.
2. Practical Application and Goals of a Legal Right of Ethical
Consideration for Non-human Animals.
So, at this point it is probably clear where this is heading. The idea of
a right of ethical consideration is to utilize existing informational laws to
assemble a larger audience for the philosophical and scientific arguments
that human actions can and do have the ability to impact the lives of nonhuman animals. Of course, it is hoped that along the way careful
consideration of particular evidence will result in the avoidance of some
human activities that could diminish an animal’s (or animals’) quality of
life. But the longer view is that an accumulation of information, even if
initially disputed, will transform into a larger societal will that extends legal
protections and rights to non-human animals.
182. John L. Moore, J., Cost-Benefit Analysis: Issues in its Use in Regulation,
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE (June 28, 1995).
183. James Wong, Debating Environmental Democracy: A Social Choice Theory
Perspective 8 (July 2008) (unpublished conference paper) (on file with author).
184. Id.; see also MATHEW HUMPHREY, ECOLOGICAL POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIC
THEORY 95 (Taylor & Francis, Apr. 26, 2007).
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Figure 1
Using Figure 1 above, let’s consider the following set of facts to
examine how a legal right of ethical consideration might use existing
informational laws to address current scientific evidence that a particular
species, in this case, elephants, have individual capabilities that are
impacted by captivity.
In 2016, three U.S. zoos—the Dallas Zoo, the Sedwick County Zoo in
Wichita, and Omaha’s Henry Doorly Zoo—sought to import up to eighteen
elephants captured from the wild in the Kingdom of Eswatini (formerly
Swaziland).185 The zoos called this proposed import “a rescue mission.”186
According to the zoos and the Eswatini Big Game Parks authority, the
estimated elephant population of thirty-nine elephants in the nation
exceeded the parks’ carrying capacity.187 The Eswatini authorities claimed
that the elephants had destroyed the vegetation in their compounds, and that
it was negatively affecting other species.188 As such, they asserted that the
only options to address the elephant population were to make arrangements
for them to be sent to U.S. zoos or to cull them.189

185. See Siebert, supra note 12, at 30–31.
186. Id.
187. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction at 8, Friends of Animals v. Ashe, No. CV 16-216 (JDB), 2016 WL
10732198 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2016), ECF No. 8–1.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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In the process of obtaining necessary permits from the U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Service for these imports, the overwhelming view of scientists that
commented on the proposal was that when elephants are confined, they
nearly always endure severe physical and physiological hardship,
especially when they have spent their entire lives in the wild.190 As sentient
animals reliant on family bonds, elephants in zoos display behavioral
abnormalities and suffer from increased disease or disability caused by
captive environments. Dr. Joyce Poole, a distinguished expert on elephant
social behavior and communication, explains it this way:
[Elephants have] renowned memories, intelligence, and
sociality of elephants have been documented repeatedly. Similar
to those of humans, these traits also make elephants particularly
vulnerable to stress and trauma and their long-term consequences.
These effects of the proposed importation would have long lasting
impacts both for the animals removed from their families and for
those remaining. The capture and removal of elephants from their
habitats, families and extended social groups is unethical and
cruel.191
In other words, elephants are one species that we can easily determine,
from both a philosophical basis and a scientific one, have species-specific
capabilities.
How do we make a case for a right of ethical consideration for these
animals? First, let us consider the use of NEPA or even cost benefit
analysis to inject the scientific evidence into the permitting process. The
questions to be asked are: (1) Is there valid scientific information available
to FWS that would be relevant as to whether any or all of these eighteen
elephants might suffer psychological, behavioral, and physical impacts
associated with captivity?; (2) If so, does FWS have a legal obligation to
adequately consider such information in complying with NEPA?; and (3)
with this information adequately considered, does it alter the way we look
at the transfer given the costs likely to be born by the elephants?
The answer to the first question is painfully clear: elephants are one of
the few species in which the scientific evidence is not only overwhelming,

190. See, e.g., Declaration of Dr. Marion Elizabeth Garaï in Support of Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction, Friends of Animals v. Ashe, No. CV 16-216 (JDB), 2016 WL
10732198 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2016), ECF No. 8-4; Declaration of Dr. Phyllis Lee in Support of
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (ECF 8-3), Friends of Animals v. Ashe, No. CV 16-216
(JDB), 2016 WL 10732198 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2016), ECF No. 8-3; Declaration of Dr. Joyce
Poole in Support of Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (ECF 8-2), Friends of Animals v.
Ashe, No. CV 16-216 (JDB), 2016 WL 10732198 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2016), ECF No. 8-2.
191. Poole Declaration, supra note 190, at ¶13.
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but also uncontested.192 With regard to the second question, there is ample
precedent that NEPA requires disclosure and consideration of this
information, even though agencies have largely failed to do so in cases like
this one.193 This includes scientific evidence that indicates a proposed
federal action might injure an animal, whether causing stress to the animals,
harassing its social structure, or otherwise causing mental harassment.194
The third question is more elusive, because it depends heavily on the level
of compassion and concern an individual decisionmaker (or any individual
asked to consider the question) may have toward elephants and other nonhuman animals. The real test is whether the addition of this new
information has the potential to alter our judgments and beliefs about the
ethics of the proposed transfer. Certainly, it might not immediately change
the regulatory disposition of the permit. Even so, it seems hard to believe
that this exercise—this right of ethical consideration afforded the
elephants—lacks potential to raise very strong compassion for these
animals that might not otherwise have existed. Compassion not only in the
decisionmakers, but the public and others who have the power to alter
decisions and legal structures to prevent future human-caused incursions
into the lives of elephants.
A second possible use of existing law and science might be the use of
consumer protection acts or other laws prohibiting the dissemination of
false information about a good, service, or public benefit. Although
certainly more controversial, there are many who would assert the zoos,
both individually and collectively, not only suppress the relevant scientific
evidence regarding the impact of captivity on some animals’ social,

192. See Marion Garai, Statement re the proposed sale and transfer of 18 elephants
from Swaziland to three Zoos in the USA, CONSERVATION ACTION TRUST (Nov. 20, 2015),
https://perma.cc/6EHV-WZLE.
193. See Recent Past Pres. Network v. Latschar, 701 F. Supp. 2d 49, 55 (D.D.C.
2010) (a court must consider whether “the agency has made an adequate compilation of
relevant information, has analyzed it reasonably, has not ignored pertinent data, and has
made public disclosures”).
194. See, e.g., Greenpeace U.S.A. v. Evans, 688 F. Supp. 579, 582–83 (W.D. Wash
1987) (requiring consideration of the government’s own concern that a proposed research
project could result in “harassment on the [killer] whales’ social structure”); WildEarth
Guardian v. Mont. Snowmobile Ass’n, 790 F.3d 920, 923, 927–28 (9th Cir. 2015)(
analyzing an agency decision that acknowledged that snowmobile use in the forest can
“stress animals and provoke a flight response during the winter season, when the animals
are particularly vulnerable to depletion of their energy reserves” and finding the agency had
not adequately addressed the possible harassment on certain “big game” species); In Def. of
Animals v. United States DOI, 751 F.3d 1054, 1069 (9th Cir. 2014) (reviewing an EA
addressing the use of helicopter roundups of wild horses on public lands that described the
actions the agency would undertake so the process “would not unnecessarily stress the
animals”); NRDC v. Winter, 645 F. Supp. 2d 841, 849-51 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (finding that
NEPA requires analysis of the effects of sonar to determine the sound level thresholds for
“harassment and injury” of whales).
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emotional and mental well-being, but actually work to convince the public
(and consumer) that the work they are doing is beneficial to the animal and
its species.195 Such acts might be considered a “deceptive commercial
practice.” For instance in Kansas, where one of the three zoos is located,
the law defines such a practice as “the knowing act, use or employment by
any person of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, or
misrepresentation of a material fact, with the intent that others shall rely
thereon in connection with the sale of any merchandise.”196 Such acts
certainly include false and misleading statements about animals that are
being used for a commercial purpose.197
Of course, a right of ethical consideration is not intended to be a tool
to prosecute and punish cruel acts against animals. It ultimately seeks to
make tangible changes to legal status of animals to provide adequate
protections to their social, emotional, and mental well-being based on the
scientific evidence of their species-specific capabilities. Returning to
Figure 1, what we are considering so far is merely the recognition of, and
some basic level of respect for, elephants’ capabilities in the process that
went into deciding to steal them away from their wild African homes.
Ultimately, of course, the goal is to support the expanding amount of
scientific knowledge about their capabilities with new procedural and
substantive rights. A starting point would be enactment of a more specific
set of informational-based laws that require consideration of an animal’s
physical and mental well-being. This would be something necessary at the
federal, state and even local levels to ensure animals receive the broadest
consideration. It would also eliminate some of the problems some will see
in using existing informational laws to advance a new right of ethical
consideration.
A second step would likely be enactment or recognition of legal
standing for animals to assert their own claim to a right of ethical
consideration in a legal proceeding (or the granting of a guardian ad litem
to do so on their behalf).198 From a substantive rights standpoint, as
discussed further in the next section, such rights need to be appropriate to
the species in consideration and their capabilities. What is intended are
minimum rights that would allow the species to fulfill its capabilities and
live a meaningful life with little or no interference from humans.
Elephants of course might be the easy case for a right of ethical
consideration. But as science illuminates the capabilities of other species,
they too deserve the same consideration, and ultimately rights. As
195. See Seibert, supra note 12, at 29–30.
196. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-6503(a) (2012).
197. See, e.g., Finstad v. Washburn University of Topeka, 845 P.2d 685, 690 (Kan.
1993).
198. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Standing for Animals (With Notes on Animal Rights),
47 UCLA L. REV. 1333, 1365 (2000).
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illustrated in Figure 1, perhaps the loftiest goal of a right of ethical
consideration is some universal understanding that all species have their
own unique capabilities, and we should seek to minimize our impact on
them even where the science is not yet robust. Ultimately, perhaps, all nonhuman animals should have the right to simply be left alone, which may be
considered the hallmark of right to liberty that humans seek.199
Finally, the right of ethical consideration I seek is not completely
hypothetical. As Martha C. Nussbaum has pointed out, “there is a happy
harbinger of what may be a new era in law, in the form of a remarkable
2016 opinion.” In that case, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the U.S. Navy
violated the law in seeking to continue a sonar program that impacted the
behavior of whales.200 While the decision is largely “a technical exercise
in statutory interpretation of the Marine Mammal Protection Act,” what
Nussbaum finds “significant, and fascinating, is that the argument relies
heavily on a consideration of whale capabilities that the program
disrupts:”201
Effects from exposures below 180 dB can cause short-term
disruption of abandonment of natural behavior patterns. These
behavioral disruptions can cause affected marine mammals to
stop communicating with each other, to flee or avoid an
ensonified area, to cease foraging for food, to separate from their
calves, and to interrupt mating. LFA sonar can also cause
heightened stress responses from marine mammals. Such
behavioral disruptions can force marine mammals to make tradeoffs like delaying migration, delaying reproduction, reducing
growth, or migrating with reduced energy reserves.202
Thus, according to Nussbaum, the court “recognize[s] whales as
beings with a complex and active form of life that includes emotional wellbeing, affiliation, and free movement: in short, a variety of species-specific
199. See, e.g., Steven J. Heyman, Constitutional Perspectives: Article: The First
Duty Of Government: Protection, Liberty And The Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J.
507, 517 n.52 (1991)(“A positive right or liberty is a right to act in a particular way, or to
receive or possess a particular thing, whereas a negative right or liberty is a right to be free
from interference or coercion); see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 124 (St. George Tucker ed., 1803 & photo. reprint 1969) ([T]he
principal aim of society is to protect individuals in the enjoyment of those absolute rights,
which were vested in them by the immutable laws of nature, but which could not be
preserved in peace without that mutual assistance and intercourse which is gained by the
institution of friendly and social communities”).
200. See id. at 1142; see generally JOSHUA HORWITZ, WAR OF THE WHALES: A TRUE
STORY (2015) (describing the sonar program in detail).
201. Nussbaum, supra note 30, at 625.
202. Id. at 625 (quoting Pritzker, 828 F.3d at 1130–31).
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forms of agency. The opinion goes well beyond Bentham, and it also
eschews the anthropocentric approach.”203
Let’s hope she is right, and this slender decision is “a new era in the
law of animal welfare.”204
IV. Critical Review: How Does a Legal Right of Ethical
Consideration for Non-human Animals Compare to Other Animal
Rights’ Theories?
No proposal to advance the rights of non-human animals will go
uncritiqued. While I do not feel it necessary to respond to the blanket
challenges out there regarding expanding our universe of rights to
animals,205 I do believe it is fair to address whether a right of ethical
consideration addresses some of the common problems with other
proposals, like personhood.206 The answer is that I think it does, and quite
decisively.
For example, with respect to the utilitarian argument that for an animal
to be given rights in our legal system, he or she must be able to “bear legal
duties” or be “legally accountable for [his or her] actions.” The capabilities
approach shows us that this not the appropriate standard for granting basic
rights, whether to humans or non-humans. A child or incapacitated person
might not be able to meet these requirements at any given time, but their
entitlement to live a meaningful life free of intrusion is not lessened. Even
the most incapacitated of us deserve to have our right to happiness, bodily
integrity, freedom of movement, etc. protected by the law.
Of course, this brings us back to the concept of “appropriate” rights.
This is also one area Wise’s theory of personhood suffered when examined.
But look, no one would argue that a 5-year-old child be granted the same
rights and freedoms of an 18-year-old adult. Nor would we argue that a
person suffering a mental incapacitation be allowed to exercise, at least
without guardianship, certain basic economic and legal decision-making.
Similarly, no one is arguing that animals be granted all the legal rights
afforded humans. That is contrary to the belief that capacities are speciesspecific. The law needs to take into consideration how best to protect those
species-specific capabilities. Perhaps for starter, we need laws prohibiting
placing any wild elephant, whale or dolphin into captivity. As of this
moment, we do not know how our actions impact the capacities of every
animal on earth. Clearly some animals, like dogs and cats, thrive in our
company. Others we know don’t, and still for many others science is still
203. Nussbaum, supra note 30, at 625.
204. Id.
205. See Cupp, supra note 5, at 1037–38; Mark Kinver, Compassionate conservation
is ‘seriously flawed’, BBC NEWS (May 18, 2019), https://perma.cc/8LVA-MTM7.
206. See supra Part II.B.2.
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considering the question. That is the point of a right of ethical
consideration—it provides an opportunity for non-human animals to have
their needs considered by us, and then if necessary, protected by
appropriate rights.
Finally, for the same reason, a right of ethical consideration also
addresses the problem of setting usable precedent for advancing the legal
rights of animals that might not meet the current tests of intelligence or
autonomy based upon our current scientific understanding. First off, it does
not rely upon these types of human characteristics to judge the rights of
non-human animals. Instead, it recognizes that every species has unique
capabilities, that may or may not be anything we experience. A right of
ethical consideration provides a pathway to discover, over time, what these
species-specific capabilities are, and to determine how we might protect
them from human interference. In this regard, I reject the criticism levied
on past approaches of animal rights regarding incrementalism.207 While it
is true that a right of ethical consideration may not protect the lives of every
animal from the start, is that what animal right advocates really want? Or
do we want a system that uses comprehensive tiers of thought to provide
the right protections for each species, so that in the long-term all life on
earth can live their best lives?208
Conclusion
As I sat here contemplating how best to end this discussion, I found
myself watching the 92nd Academy Awards. While deeply distracted by
the right of ethical consideration (and all the criticism it may receive), I am
interrupted by the awarding of the best actor award to Joaquin Phoenix for
his role in the Joker, and of course, his passionate acceptance of the award
on behalf of all animals:
I’m full of so much gratitude now. I do not feel elevated
above any of my fellow nominees or anyone in this room, because
we share the same love – that’s the love of film. And this form of
expression has given me the most extraordinary life. I don’t know
where I’d be without it. But I think the greatest gift that it’s given
me, and many people in [this industry] is the opportunity to use
our voice for the voiceless. I’ve been thinking about some of the
distressing issues that we’ve been facing collectively.
I think at times we feel or are made to feel that we champion
different causes. But for me, I see commonality. I think, whether

207. See, e.g., Bryant, supra note 4, at 288–89.
208. See Singer, supra note 94, at 2 (“The basic principle of equality does not require
equal or identical treatment; it requires equal consideration. Equal consideration for
different beings may lead to different treatment and different rights.”).
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we’re talking about gender inequality or racism or queer rights or
indigenous rights or animal rights, we’re talking about the fight
against injustice. We’re talking about the fight against the belief
that one nation, one people, one race, one gender, one species, has
the right to dominate, use and control another with impunity.
I think we’ve become very disconnected from the natural
world. Many of us are guilty of an egocentric world view, and we
believe that we’re the center of the universe. We go into the
natural world and we plunder it for its resources. We feel entitled
to artificially inseminate a cow and steal her baby, even though
her cries of anguish are unmistakable. Then we take her milk
that’s intended for her calf and we put it in our coffee and our
cereal.
We fear the idea of personal change, because we think we
need to sacrifice something; to give something up. But human
beings at our best are so creative and inventive, and we can create,
develop and implement systems of change that are beneficial to
all sentient beings and the environment.
I have been a scoundrel all my life, I’ve been selfish. I’ve
been cruel at times, hard to work with, and I’m grateful that so
many of you in this room have given me a second chance. I think
that’s when we’re at our best: when we support each other. Not
when we cancel each other out for our past mistakes, but when we
help each other to grow. When we educate each other; when we
guide each other to redemption.
When he was 17, my brother [River] wrote this lyric. He
said: “run to the rescue with love and peace will follow.209
You can imagine my excitement hearing these words at that exact
time. Perhaps my ideas were not so extreme after all was my first thought.
Quickly, it settled into my mind that this should not just be another
profound assertion of our disconnect with the natural world and treatment
of non-human animals. Too many similar thoughts have been uttered over
the centuries. It is time to undertake a change in how we consider our
impact on other species. Perhaps to build upon Martha C. Nussbaum’s
thought, a right of ethical consideration is a first step in “a new era” of
human/non-human relations.

209.
Christy Piña, Oscars: Read Joaquin Phoenix’s Best Actor Speech, THE
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Feb. 9, 2020), https://perma.cc/AV2B-Y7S3.
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